On June 25, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department identified Vector Casa de Bolsa, owned by Alfonso Romo, as a key entity in money laundering for Mexican cartels, including Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación, and in facilitating payments for fentanyl precursors between 2018 and 2023. The indictment, supported by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), involves transactions totaling $2 million and ties to Genaro García Luna, former Secretary of Public Security. In response, the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) intervened in Vector’s management on June 26, replacing its administrative bodies to “protect investors.” This move, although preemptive, exposes the vulnerability of Mexican financial institutions to foreign accusations and calls into question the integrity of Romo, a businessman with historical ties to the 4T (Tourist Party).
Alfonso Romo, former head of Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s Office of the Presidency between 2018 and 2020, left the 4T government in December 2020, officially by his own decision, arguing that he had served his term after helping to coordinate priority projects such as the Mayan Train. However, his departure was perceived as a break with López Obrador due to disagreements over economic policies and the growing radicalization of the 4T (Tourist Party). Romo, a magnate with interests in agribusiness and finance, represented a bridge to the business sector that the 4T (Tourist Party) never fully consolidated. His departure left a tense relationship with the government, marked by the distrust of his influence and his past as an advisor to PRI governments by some sectors of Morena.
The intervention of Vector, which manages 290 billion pesos in assets under custody, has found no evidence of money laundering, according to the Ministry of Finance, which reports only administrative irregularities sanctioned with 134 million pesos between Vector, CIBanco, and Intercam. However, the US indictment, which will take effect in mid-July, threatens to limit Vector’s international operations, a significant blow to Romo, whose fortune depends on trust in his financial institutions. The CNBV assures that client assets are protected, but the shadow of the accusations lingers, fueled by the lack of transparency in Vector’s operations and its alleged relationship with Chinese companies linked to the trade of chemical precursors.
The current relationship between Romo and Claudia Sheinbaum’s government is distant and pragmatic. Although the 4T has defended the soundness of the Mexican financial system and demanded evidence from the Treasury Department, it has not shown explicit support for Romo. Sheinbaum, in line with López Obrador, has avoided directly confronting the US, but official rhetoric suggests a defense of financial sovereignty in the face of what they describe as baseless accusations. Vector’s intervention seems more like an attempt to contain reputational damage than support for Romo, who faces scrutiny that could weaken his position in the private sector and his legacy as a bridge between the 4T and business leaders.
The Vector case exposes the contradictions of the 4T: a government that claims to fight corruption, but fails to disassociate itself from controversial figures like Romo. The US accusations, although unproven in Mexico, reinforce the perception that the national financial system remains vulnerable to organized crime. For Romo, the scandal represents an existential crisis: his departure from the 4T left him politically isolated, and now his financial empire is in jeopardy. While the CNBV and the Treasury insist there is no evidence of illicit activity, the lack of clarity and pending US sanctions keep Romo in a precarious position, with the risk that this episode could mark the decline of his influence in Mexico.